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     There was little agreement in Christian circles in 17th-century Europe as to the 
nature of the millennium, let alone how, when, where or if, it would occur. 
Nevertheless, certain characteristics were common to most interpretations of this 
term. Most importantly, the “thousand (years)” denoted in the term “millennium” 
refers to the thousand year reign of the returned Christ or Messiah which will take 
place before or after certain events which were prophesied in the Bible2. While 
various passages figure in the discussions and predictions of the millennium, the loci 
classici are the latter part of the Book of Daniel in the Old Testament and the last 
book of the New Testament canon – the Book of Revelation to John or the 
Apocalypse. The latter term is the more prevalent one both in 17th-century circles and 
today. The cynosure of the most millenarians is Chapter 20 of the Apocalypse, since 
the only references to a thousand-year period (six of them) are in this chapter3. 
     Other connotations are associated with an apocalyptic vision of the millennium. 
Whereas millenarianism is often associated with a progressive, human-initiated 
utopianism, our era stressed its pessimistic side, seeing the immediate end of the 
world as we know it (followed, to be sure, by paradise for true believers)4. Such 
apocalyptic views also rejected gradualist or spiritual interpretations. Sudden 
awesome cataclysmic events – whether natural or human – would usher in the 
millennium5. The traditional view that “the millenial reign of Christ described in 
Revelation 20 was a spiritual reality”6 alone, that had already occurred, was rejected. 
Signs were present everywhere attesting to the imminence of the millennium, from 
the striking increase of knowledge in the 17th century (as predicted in Daniel 12, e.g., 
                                                 
1 An earlier draft of some parts of this paper were read by Daniel Cook at the VIth International 
Leibniz Congress in Hannover (1994). 
2 Those who believe that Christ’s heavenly reign is a thousand year period before the return of Christ 
on Earth are called post-millenialists; those who believe that the millennium follows Christ’s return are 
called pre-millenialists. Radical English millenarians were usually pre-millenialists. See S. Brachlow: 
The Communion of Saints, Radical Puritan and Separatist Ecclesiology: 1570-1625, Oxford University 
Press 1988, p. 85. Amillenialism is the conventional theological position of the Church, developed 
primarily by Augustine. It “equat[es] ... the thousand year reign of Christ and His Saints with the whole 
history and life-span of the Church militant on earth, with the denial of a future millenium as a 
corollary...” P. Toon: “Introduction” in: Puritans, the Millenium and the Future of Israel: Puritan 
Eschatology 1600 to 1660, ed. P. Toon, J. Clarke 1970, p. 17. For an excellent discussion of the various 
types of millenarianism, see B. Capp: “‘Godly Rule’ and English Millenarianism” in: The Intellectual 
Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, ed. C. Webster, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1974, pp. 386-398. 
3 Toon: “Introduction”, pp. 8-9. While the beginning of the millennium is not anchored in any striking 
calendrical dates like 1000 or 2000 C.E., many did find the date 1666 particularly auspicious. First, it is 
the number of the false prophet or “beast from the earth” in Revelation 13:18: “This calls for wisdom: 
let anyone with understanding calculate the number of the beast, for it is the number of a person. Its 
number is six hundred sixty-six.” Second, the years 1666  apparently coincided with a numerologically 
fraught date in the Hebrew calendar (5426), which indeed was the year of the appearance of the false 
prophet or Messiah – Sabbatai Zevi – who deceived many Jews. 
4 Capp: “‘Godly Rule’ and English Millenarianism”, p. 387. 
5 Ibid., p. 396. 
6 Brachlow: The Communion of Saints, Radical Puritan and Separatist Ecclesiology: 1570-1625, p. 84. 
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according to Newton7) to various natural disorders and monstrosities such as 
calamitous earthquakes and the ominous streaking of comets in the heavens. 
Historical events such as the destruction of the Spanish Armada and the Thirty Years 
war on the continent were also seen as powerful omens. 
     The defining characteristic of millenarian interpretations is when the interpreter 
sees the Apocalyptic prophesies as being realized. There are technical terms to 
describe the three positions that can be taken. Though they are not necessarily 
exclusive, an author usually chooses to stress one of them and its attendant 
implications. The traditional approach – called praeterism (“pastism”) – viewed the 
prophecies of the Apocalypse as occurring in the past and thus as having been already 
fulfilled in the earthly realm – either at the time they were written (the first century 
C.E.) or in succeeding generations. Presentism characterizes the set of beliefs held by 
many of the millenarians in the 17th century, viz., that the prophecies of the 
Apocalypse are currently being fulfilled. Finally, there is futurism – the belief that the 
prophecies contained in the books of Daniel and Revelation are to be realized in the 
(indefinite) future here on earth – though their spiritual analogues may be currently 
being realized in Heaven. Henry More and Isaac Newton are good examples of 
futurists in 17th-century England. 
 
I. Why did Millenarianism concern Leibniz? 
 
     One could answer this question (and one would not be that wrong!) by saying that 
since Leibniz was interested in virtually everything that went on in his day, it trivially 
follows that he would be concerned with millenarianism. But there are substantive 
reasons why the issue engaged him. Unlike his rationalist contemporaries, Leibniz’s 
rationalism operated not only on the philosophical or logical plane, but on an 
historical one as well. History, the events occurring in history, and the problem of 
historical knowledge vexed him throughout his life on purely philosophical as well as 
on theological grounds. Unlike his Cartesian counterparts, for example, who 
dismissed, distrusted or feared (because of Church authorities) the results of historical 
research, Leibniz saw in the proper study of history an avenue for determining the 
truths of natural and revealed Christian theology. His treatment of specific biblical 
narratives and his lifelong belief in Mosaic chronology8 as well as his use of history 
and historical sources in general are central to his theological project. Leibniz’s own 
worldliness as well as his rationalism precluded his taking a fundamentalist or fideist 
position on the truth of Scripture, but his belief in the authenticity of biblical 
prophecy coupled with his opposition to the historical skepticism of thinkers such as 
Spinoza and Hobbes necessitated a strong defense of the possibility of valid historical 
knowledge of the biblical period. Hence Leibniz has to grapple with millenarian 
interpretations of history – whether biblical or modern. If theoretical arguments for 
God’s existence are being undermined, history remains the last bastion for rationalist 
believers9. 
                                                 
7 See F. E. Manuel: The Religion of Isaac Newton, Clarendon Press 1974, Appendix A, “Fragments 
from a Treatise on Revelation,” p. 107. 
8 Leibniz at least accepted Mosaic chronology with respect to humankind, believing that the Earth was 
first peopled around 6,000 years ago. However Leibniz’s geology, as stated for example in the 
Protogaea, commits him to an Earth much older than 6,000 years. 
9 Leibniz writes to Morell (1 October 1697; A I, 14, 551) that the proper study of history – more 
specifically ancient history – will “serve as the basis for demonstrating the truth of religion.” For a 
more detailed discussion of Leibniz’s treatment of biblical history, see D. Cook: “Leibniz: Biblical 
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     Leibniz’s approach to Scripture was also threatened by the rising wave of those 
millenarians and enthusiasts who believed that the traditional ecclesiastical and 
historical bases for believing in Scripture were misguided and counter-productive. 
Such beliefs formed a central leitmotif of many Protestant sects (e.g., the Pietists, 
Quakers and Dissenters). The Word of God had to be appropriated anew, directly or 
“mystically,” in effect superseding biblical prophecy. While admiring their piety and 
practice, Leibniz nevertheless admonishes (often with some irony) their belief that 
their experiences come directly from God10. 
     But finally, and perhaps most importantly, the various manifestations of 
millenarianism, enthusiasm and even pietism often represented genuine threats to the 
social and political order for Leibniz. The second half of the 17th century saw a 
tremendous growth in the ability of such movements – especially in Protestant areas – 
to create as well as benefit from political unrest. As we shall see below, it was 
Leibniz’s political fears as well as attendant theological concerns that motivated 
much of his concern about millenarianism and prompted him to deal with it at some 
length. 
 
II. Why Study Leibniz’s Treatment of Millenarianism? 
 
     The purpose of this essay is to examine Leibniz’s attitude towards, and arguments 
relating to, millenarianism. While important in its day, millenarianism per se is 
admittedly not a central concern of Leibniz’s work. Nevertheless, it bears scrutiny for 
several reasons. First, millenarians were among those who make up what Richard 
Popkin has called “the third force in philosophy”. They were so termed because “they 
tended to combine elements of empirical and rationalist thought with theosophic 
speculations and Millenarian interpretation of Scripture”11. As part of this group, they 
constituted an important, if subterranean, influence on later philosophical, intellectual 
and theological developments, according to Popkin and others. 
     In this vein, a close examination of Leibniz’s views on the religious controversies 
of his day – such as millenarianism – will contribute to answering several key 
questions that occupy current Leibniz scholarship. Understanding Leibniz’s reaction 
to certain influential “fringe movements” of his time – which rejected the prevailing 
orthodoxy – such as millenarianism, kabbalism and various forms of enthusiasm 
(Schwärmerei) may contribute to answering basic questions about the interpretation 
and evolution of Leibniz’s metaphysics and theology. Leibniz’s philosophy – more 
than any other in his time – was fired in the crucible of the dialectical give-and-take 
on a myriad of issues, including ones that may appear tangential or irrelevant to 
students of Leibniz today. As the last major philosopher to defend orthodox Christian 
doctrine in a systematic fashion, it is necessary to examine his reactions to various 
unorthodox theologies – especially the more radical ones – to see if and how 
Leibniz’s metaphysics and theology form a consistent whole: a claim that many, 
                                                                                                                                            
Historian and Exegete” in: Leibniz’s Auseinandersetzung mit Vorgängern und Zeitgenossen, eds. I. 
Marchlewitz & A. Heinekamp, F. Steiner 1990, pp. 267-276. 
10 “It is certainly true that the contentment we find in contemplating God’s greatness and goodness, and 
in carrying out his will and practising the virtues, is a blessing from God, and one of the greatest. But it 
is not always a blessing which needs renewed supernatural assistance, as many of these good people 
claim.” New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. and ed. P. Remnant and J. Bennett, Cambridge 
University Press 1996, p. 506. 
11 R. Popkin, The Third Force in Seventeenth Century Thought, Brill 1992, pp. 90-91. 
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especially Bertrand Russell12, deny. A clearer understanding of Leibniz’s non-
metaphysical and non-logical writings on such issues may explain some of the 
inconsistencies attributed to him. Such an undertaking may aid us in answering the 
question Popkin recently posed: “Do we have to have two, or maybe three, or four 
Leibnizes to make him compatible, or can we see all of this as part of the religious 
context of his ideas?”13. 
     A final purpose of this study is to highlight some strategies Leibniz employed in 
his treatment of millenarianism that may be helpful in elaborating his method of 
argumentation. As a courtier and diplomat, Leibniz was always sensitive to his 
audience and was willing to “accommodate himself” (Leibniz’s own words) to the 
biases of his interlocutors as a way of bringing them around to his position. Perhaps 
more than any other philosopher, Leibniz knew that most people are not swayed by 
abstract arguments, even if formally valid. 
 
III. Leibniz as an Interpreter of the Apocalypse 
 
     Millenarianism – or chiliasm – is discussed, used and abused by Leibniz from his 
earliest writings. Towards the end of the 17th-century, chiliastic fervor had waned 
(even in England where it was strongest) and had spent itself as a force to be 
reckoned with, theologically as well  as politically. Thus Leibniz’s substantive 
comments on millenarianism virtually cease after the early 1690s, except for one 
important discussion mentioned below. Even earlier, it is clear that Leibniz never 
appreciated millenarian doctrine as a political or providential interpretation of human 
or natural events, nor did he see any cosmic or “premonitory” implications in any 
contemporary or anticipated historical events (e.g. the unification of the Churches, 
etc.). His treatment of history is resolutely non-moralistic and non-providential.  
Leibniz, as Catherine Wilson puts it, “does not regard the earth as a hot house of 
seething corruption, headed towards climactic events of destruction and 
purification”14. This is clear from Leibniz’s most sustained examination of the 
theoretical underpinnings of millenarianism doctrine, namely his essay (approx. 2500 
words) of 1677, entitled (by Leibniz himself) Summaria Apocalypseos Explicatio (A 
Summary Explanation of the Apocalypse), which explains, analyzes and critiques 
specific textual interpreters of the Revelation of St. John15. It constitutes, in effect, a 
running commentary on the whole book – the only such commentary on a biblical 
                                                 
12 See B. Russell: A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, 2nd ed., Allen and Unwin 1975. 
An investigation into Leibniz’s treatment of such movements (of which this essay is one of several) can 
contribute to the resolution of one of the problematic issues of Leibniz scholarship raised by Bertrand 
Russell, i.e. whether or not Leibniz had an esoteric philosophy at odds with his published writings (e.g. 
the Theodicy). 
13 R. Popkin: “The Religious Background of Seventeenth Century Thought”, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 25 (1987), p. 48. 
14 C. Wilson: Leibniz’s Metaphysics. A Historical and Comparative Study, Princeton University Press 
1990, p. 296. Wilson also mentions the passage in the Theodicée, (§245), in his discussion of The 
Sacred Theory of the Earth, by Thomas Burnet, where Leibniz sees only intelligent design throughout 
creation, not supernatural omens in apparent cosmic disorder (e.g. sunspots or comets). As an example 
of a contemporary thinker who indulged in such sentiments, there is the American philosopher, 
Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758). “Edwards... was very much a part of the intellectual world still 
governed by the quasi-magical directives of divine providence, one where the appearance of comets 
boded extreme natural calamities on earth, where decay of trade and industry served as a warning and a 
penalty against what could only be a surfeit of vice throughout the nation.” W. Spellman: John Locke 
and the Problem of Depravity, Clarendon Press 1988, p. 144. 
15 A VI, 4, 2475-2483. 
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text undertaken by Leibniz (except for his brief commentary on the story of Bileam). 
Leibniz’s later remarks on the Apocalypse – strewn throughout his correspondence – 
especially with Hermann van der Hardt, the noted Orientalist and biblical scholar, 
essentially confirm his position in the Explicatio16. 
     In his opening, Leibniz proposes “this rule of interpretation: It is probable that all 
the events in so far as it is possible, ought to be understood as contemporaneous with 
John”17. While appreciating the enthusiasm which this powerful work engendered in 
his own day, he nevertheless resolutely sticks to the orthodox praeterist position: that 
the “Babylon” referred to in the Apocalypse is “Rome”, but the Rome which 
persecuted the early Christians, not the Roman Catholic Church. He then gives a 
warning which is echoed repeatedly throughout the later discussion of the text – that 
“we must beware of any forced, calculated [“frigida”] or overtly detailed 
interpretation”18. Leibniz then begins his running commentary on the Apocalypse, 
mostly chapter by chapter. 
     Leibniz’s remarks constitute an Auseinandersetzung with Grotius’s running 
commentary of the text, Annotationes ad Apocalypsin19. He usually follows Grotius, 
but often objects to his detailed allegorical explanations. In fastening onto Grotius’s 
commentary, Leibniz chose a serious, respected, mainstream thinker rather than a 
fringe enthusiast or radical millenarian. His choice is a revealing one. Leibniz 
obviously was much in sympathy with Grotius’s exegetical techniques, including his 
philological approach to biblical texts20. 
     Space prevents us from going into great detail on his commentary, but certain 
themes are repeated and clear positions taken on the hermeneutical issues. Briefly, 
Leibniz’s strategy is to treat the Apocalypse as a coherent document, requiring a 
literary and historical analysis of the text as a whole. Recurring figures and themes 
are analyzed. Literal language must be distinguished from obvious allegorical images, 
etc. Like Grotius, his purpose is to locate the meaning of the text in the age of its 
author (in the first century C.E.). Leibniz thus concentrates on those passages which 
support such historical references, rather than attempt to decipher minutely the more 
dramatic and poetic ones. 
     Leibniz often does expound on the allegorical nature of the text in some detail 
(e.g. his exegesis on the opening of the Seventh Seal and the Blowing of the first four 
trumpets in Chapter 821), explaining the probable historical allusions of such dramatic 
                                                 
16 Leibniz never picked up on Hermann van der Hardt’s praeterist interpretation (see his letters to 
Leibniz, A I, 6, 494-495 and 551-553), which sees the “beast,” “dragon,” “whore,” etc., as referring to 
the Jews and the Jewish establishment in first century C.E. Jerusalem. In other scriptural exegeses, he 
relies substantially on this renowned biblical scholar and Orientalist (see Cook: “Leibniz: Biblical 
Historian and Exegete”, pp. 274-275), but in this case he says later that he finds it “contrived.” A I, 9, 
228. 
17 A VI, 4, 2475. Leibniz’s emphasis. 
18 Ibid. 
19 In his Annotationum in Novum Testamentum pars tertia ac ultima. Cui subjuncti sunt ejusdem 
auctoris libri pro veritate religionis Christianae, Paris 1650. See A VI, 4, 2473. 
20 “The technique of literary criticism applied systematically to the text of the Book of Revelations is 
really a development of nineteenth-century scholarship. But it was anticipated, to a limited extent, by 
Grotius in his application of the “contemporary-historical” method of exegesis. Since he wished to 
assign different parts of the text to different historical settings, and since he observed that there was 
more than one tradition as to the place and date of composition, Grotius conjectured that the Book [of 
Revelation] was made up of several visions which had been written down at different times, either on 
Patmos in the time of Claudius or at Ephesus under Vespasian”. J. M. Court: Myth and History in the 
Book of Revelation, John Knox Press 1979, pp. 13-14. 
21 A VI, 4, 2477. 
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imagery. But he warns again about overdoing it as Grotius and other serious 
commentators have done: “To wish to explain in minute detail this mountain of fire 
[8:8], for example, and the name of Wormwood [given to a star; 8:9] is useless and 
incongruous, for these are images of visions”22. Such detailed attempts lead to a 
lifeless, overly literal interpretation which detracts from the power and drama of the 
text23. 
     For a specific example of Leibniz’s approach, let us examine his treatment of 
Chapter 20 – the key chapter for believers in the millennium and in the ultimate 
resurrection and victory of the saints and martyrs24. Leibniz accepts Grotius’s 
interpretation of the Resurrection of the Saints as meaning that their memories are 
revived and venerated by the Church. The description of the Resurrection here should 
not be taken literally – a typical rationalist gloss on a miracle25. As for the 1000 years 
referred to in this chapter, he speculates that it might be an historical prediction about 
the 1000 years between Constantine’s recognition of Christianity and the hoped-for 
destruction of the Ottoman Empire. In any event, he sees many problems with such 
speculations and concludes his commentary on this central chapter for millenarianism 
with the disclaimer: “This allegory is to be seen as representing an allusion to ancient 
traditions whose precision is not deemed certain”26. 
     Leibniz’s reading of this chapter clearly rejects any supernatural or strictly 
historical explanation of the text; it is a direct rejection of millenarian histiography 
and eschatology. The close reader of Leibniz’s text will notice a change of tone in 
some of his comments on this chapter as opposed to earlier ones. Earlier, Leibniz 
speculated upon the text, exploring various possible alternatives to those that Grotius 
and others followed: e.g. is the “Second Beast” the emperor Trajan or is it the pagan 
Roman empire itself27? However, when the miraculous Resurrection of the Saints and 
Martyrs is described in Chapter 20, the tone of his comments changes from 
exploratory and tentative to decidedly skeptical and matter-of-fact. 
 
IV. Leibniz’s Use of his Interpretation of the Apocalypse 
 
     What makes Leibniz’s specific interpretation of the Apocalypse more than an 
academic exercise is his use of it in counteracting strongly sectarian views, thus 
forwarding long-held ecumenical and political views. Leibniz often pleaded the 
Protestant cause in his ecumenical efforts with his Catholic correspondents. For 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Frigidior Grotii interpretatio... Nimis minuta consectatur.” A VI, 4, 2478-2479. 
24 Johann Alsted’s influential book (more so in England than in his native Germany) – Diatribe de 
mille annis Apocalypticis (1627) – is basically an exposition of this chapter. It is striking that Alsted 
(1588-1638), the most noted of the Herborn encyclopaedists and the most influential German thinker 
upon English millenarianism of the “cataclysmic school” (Capp: “‘Godly Rule’ and English 
Millenarianism”, p. 396) is never mentioned by Leibniz. Though he was quite familiar with other 
works of Alsted – Leibniz even planned an improved and completed edition of Alsted’s Encyclopedia 
(A VI, 2, 394-397) – we find no references to Alsted’s millenarianism or his Diatribe in Leibniz’s 
writings or correspondence, though he had read it. Howard Hotson notes that “Leibniz’s awareness of 
Alsted’s millenarianism is demonstrated by the underlining and marginalia in his copy of Alsted’s 
Diatribe . . . (Niedersächsische Landesbiblithek shelf mark T-A 150).” See H. Hotson: “Leibniz and 
Millenarianism”, in: The Young Leibniz and his Philosophy (1646-1676), ed. S. Brown, Kluwer 1999, 
p. 174, n. 14. 
25 For Leibniz’s treatment of the talking she-ass and the appearance of the angel to Bileam, see Cook: 
“Leibniz: Biblical Historian and Exegete”. pp. 274-275. 
26 A, VI, 4: 2483. 
27 A, VI, 4: 2480. 
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example, he faults the Catholics for making John’s authorship of the Apocalypse a 
dogma of the Church28. But he also tried to counteract anti-ecumenical streams in his 
own camp. In a letter to the Landgraf29, he tells his Catholic correspondent that Jakob 
Spener –founder of German pietism – “and other well-intentioned people” object to 
the primacy of the Pope because they have been prejudiced by their presentist 
interpretation of the Apocalypse, which equates Rome of St. John’s day with the seat 
of the Papacy. Leibniz claims that he does not know who is the Anti-Christ, but 
ridicules the notion that it is Pope Innocent XI. Indeed, Leibniz admits that the 
Apocalypse does perhaps have a mystical sense as well as the literal one he espouses. 
But the former relates to “the end of days” and is still unfathomable to us30. Leibniz 
later praises Bossuet’s book (L’explication de l’Apocalypse [1689]) several times, 
making it quite clear that he rejected contemporary anti-Catholic interpretations of the 
Apocalypse31. 
    But Leibniz’s attitude towards millenarianism was ultimately dictated by political 
considerations, not theological ones. Leibniz used his interpretation of the Apocalypse 
to attack strongly any millenarian interpretation which might provoke anti-
Establishment sects to disturb the public order. Later, asked his opinion on some 
point of the Apocalypse, Leibniz told a correspondent that “knowing that false 
interpretations of prophecies have been potent tools for disturbing the masses, I 
would wish that one could destroy at the roots this pretext by demonstrating that the 
Apocalypse no longer concerned future matters as much as one hitherto believed”32. 
     It is this political concern that primarily motivated Leibniz’s interest in 
millenarianism over the years. Recently, a note by Leibniz on the Apocalypse has 
been published in the Akademie edition, series 6 volume 4 (along with the original 
Latin version of the Summaria)33. It is revealing on several counts: first, it is written 
in German, perhaps so that it may have more effect as anti-millenarian ammunition 
on a more popular or political level. Secondly, he prefaces a brief account of his 
views in the Summaria with the reasons he had for writing it in the first place – 
something he did not do in the (much-longer Latin) Summaria. The tone (as well as 
the language) of the opening paragraph is quite different from the Latin text. In it he 
explains why he is taking time out to write such a commentary, even though he does 
not believe in any of the millenarian views which preoccupied many in the 17th 
century. This is the opening paragraph: 
 
“I observe that many God-fearing and well-meaning people have been misled by false or quite dubious 
interpretations of the Revelation, so that all sorts of elaborate schemes as well as rebellions and 
mutinies arise from them. Some, under the color of [it being] God’s command, dare to dictate to kings 
and princes what they ought to do, and, in the case of refusal or whatever, incite the public against 
them. I therefore wish to propose – with little effort – a special interpretation of the Revelation which 
will cut off these dangerous thoughts once and for all. Not that I consider this interpretation to be the 
best or most correct, but [I do it] so that one sees how easy it would be – if a man is well-read and 
quick-witted – to devise something clever out of both the text and its history.”34 
 
                                                 
28 A I, 4, 354-355. 
29 Ibid., pp. 324-325. 
30 Ibid., pp. 358, 405-406; A I, 6, 203. 
31 See A I, 6, 588; A I, 4, 203. 
32 A I, 6, 588. 
33 A VI, 4, 2473-2474. The note, entitled “Sonderbare Erklärung der Offenbarung,” is at LH I, 4, 4, bl. 
4; the Summaria is at the three preceding pages, LH I, 4, 4, bl. 1-3. 
34 A VI, 4, 2473. 
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     In Leibniz’s mind, and in the minds of many European thinkers, millenarianism 
was inextricably bound up with other antinomian and unorthodox sects which 
appeared – often dramatically – on the scene35. The fact that some had political 
agendas led Leibniz to see the chiliasts as political nuisances or troublemakers and as 
misguided observers of both human and natural events36. Concerned to address the 
root of their seditious views, Leibniz believed that the best way to “fight fire is with 
fire”: to present a non-revolutionary interpretation of the Apocalypse to undercut 
more dangerous ones. Whether his hypothesis concerning the text is the most 
plausible or not is of little interest to him. The point is to meet one’s opponent on his 
own ground – on and in his own terms if possible – thus appearing interested and 
sympathetic to his efforts, and then to proceed to undercut them37. Reduce your 
opponent’s position to one that looks no more plausible than another one and you 
undermine his whole endeavor. (Might one call this an ego quoque argument?) 
Leibniz took pride in his ability to communicate with others according to their 
backgrounds, interests and prejudices. He was capable of functioning in many 
different “universes of discourse,” scholarly or non-scholarly. But a serious 
discussion by Leibniz of a topic dear to the hearts of millenarians should not blind 
one to Leibniz’s underlying lack of seriousness about many of their concerns38. 
 
V. Leibniz and “Simple Chiliasm” 
 
     However it would be unwise to conclude from the foregoing that Leibniz’s sole 
response to millenarianism was one of concern or alarm, as for the most part this was 
not the case. To one correspondent, Leibniz urges tolerance towards those holding 
millenarian views: 
 
“I find throughout history that sects are ordinarily born by an excessive opposition to those who had 
some particular opinion, and under the pretext of preventing heresies, one gives rise to them. These 
                                                 
35 It should be noted that many references which Leibniz makes to chiliasm, especially in his 
voluminous correspondence, are connected with enthusiasm and visionary mysticism. Leibniz’s 
remarks on Mede and Grotius, for example, are different: their weighty textual interpretation of 
Scripture and their scholarly reputations merit a more serious response on his part; Leibniz never 
associates such writers with the more enthusiastic side of Millenarianism. The close connection 
between the enthusiasts and Schwärmer (such as Rosamunde de Asseburg) and millenarianism for 
Leibniz is examined in D. Cook: “Leibniz on Enthusiasm” in: Leibniz, Mysticism and Religion, eds. 
Allison P. Coudert, Richard H. Popkin and Gordon M. Weiner, Dordrecht 1998, pp. 107-135. 
36 See, for example, Leibniz’s letter to Gerhard Meier of 31 December 1692/10 January 1693, in which 
he attacks the use of details extrapolated from the Apocalypse, claiming that such “nonsense...disturbs 
simple minds and often disturbs public peace...” A I, 9, 228. 
37 One writer has claimed that this was an accepted method in critiques of Biblical authority, used by 
Spinoza and Kant: “To be effective the critique must have an affinity with the mind of its audience; 
[f]or without taking the public’s point of departure into account, no dialogue, much less a change in its 
attitude is possible. At this point Biblical exegesis becomes instrumental as a fictitious common ground 
between the critic and his audience. Since the believer in revealed religion cannot share the 
philosopher’s first principles, the philosopher must pose as sharing the believer’s first principles by 
appealing to the Bible, then turn the former against themselves.” Y. Yovel: Kant and the Philosophy of 
History, Princeton University Press 1980, p. 214. Unlike Spinoza and Kant, Leibniz was an orthodox 
believer, but he did not believe that the Apocalypse contained any genuine prophetic elements. 
38 Perhaps some of the reasons that Popkin gives for the lack of acrimony between Leibniz and the 
French Skeptics might also be true of his relationship with the millenarians and their supporters, viz. 
Popkin’s discussion of Leibniz’s apocryphal remarks that “a philosopher is not always obliged to be 
serious in making hypotheses.” R. Popkin: “Leibniz and the French Skeptics”, Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie 76-77 (1966), p. 247. On this point, see D. Cook: “Understanding the ‘Other’ Leibniz”, 
The Philosophical Forum 23 (1992), pp. 204-205. 
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things usually fade out of their own accord, when the virtue of novelty wears off; but when one tries to 
oppress them by making a big fuss of them, by persecutions, and by refutations, it is as if one tried to 
extinguish a fire with a bellows. It is like a torch which is dying out, but is rekindled because of 
agitation. Out of fear that there are no heretics, theologians sometimes do all they can to find them; and 
to immortalize them, they give them derogatory names, like Chiliasts, Jansenists, Quietists, Pietists, 
and Payonists.”39 
 
     These remarks were prompted by the exploits of Rosamund von der Asseburg, 
who came to Leibniz’s intention in late 1691. Asseburg claimed to have had visions 
of Christ since her youth, and also that he dictated writings to her, some of which 
contained prophesies. At one point it was thought that she had prophesised that the 
millennial reign would begin in 1693, though this was subsequently denied by her 
since “only God was aware of the [actual] time”40. What marked out Asseburg’s 
millenarian interpretation from some of the others Leibniz had come across was its 
innocuousness. Asseburg was no agitator, nor were her followers – they had no 
political manifesto for hastening the millennial kingdom and were quite content to 
wait for Christ to return in his own time. Although unconvinced by Asseburg’s 
claims, Leibniz did not think that she or her followers ought to be persecuted: “the 
best thing is to let these good people be, as long as they do not interfere in anything 
that can be of consequence” 41. Hence they are what Leibniz considers to be the 
acceptable face of millenarianism: 
 
“...I would not want those who are called Chiliasts or Millenarians to be persecuted for an opinion to 
which the Apocalypse appears so favourable. The Augsburg Confession seems only to be against 
Millenarians destructive of the public order. But the error of those who wait patiently for the Kingdom 
of Jesus Christ seems quite harmless”42. 
 
     Evidently Leibniz drew a sharp distinction between seditious (and harmful) 
millenarianist interpretations, and those without seditious import (and which are thus 
harmless). This distinction is apparent in other writings; for example in a letter to 
Hermann von der Hardt, Leibniz explains: “I think that simple chiliasm (i.e., chiliasm 
lacking seditious opinions) should be tolerated more than approved”43. In other 
words, when faced with a non-seditious interpretation of millenarianism it is 
acceptable to express the sort of disapproval that befits a harmless error, but not to 
push the disapproval to the point where it becomes persecution. And Leibniz 
practised what he preached. Upon finding an innocuous millenarian interpretation in a 
book entitled Seder Olam, he wrote: “But the largest part of the book contains fancies 
about the apocalypse and about the explanation of  prophecies...which each man can 
invent freely”44. Here Leibniz registers his disagreement with the millenarian 
interpretation to be found in the book, but not in any vociferous way. The 
interpretation with which he is dealing has no seditious import, so Leibniz feels able 
to simply disagree with it and move on45. 
                                                 
39 A I, 7, 38-39. 
40 A I, 7, 32. 
41 A I, 7, 38. For more details of this curious episode see Cook, “Leibniz on enthusiasm”, pp. 121-123. 
42 A I, 7, 36-37. Leibniz is mistaken in his interpretation of the Augsburg Confession, §17 of which 
clearly condemns millenarianism on doctrinal grounds with no distinction between millenarians who 
are a public nuisance and those who are not. 
43 A I, 6, 549. Cf. A I, 8, 369: “I think pietists should be tolerated, and Chiliasts even forgiven, 
provided that they do not do or teach anything that disturbs [people’s] minds”. 
44 A I, 11, 23. 
45 See also §18 of the Theodicée, where Leibniz discusses the “theology, well-nigh astronomical” of 
another millenarian. His apocalyptic visions of the eschaton, Leibniz says, “seemed to me pleasing ... 
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     Consequently, except for his emphatic political proviso, Leibniz generally had a 
live-and-let-live attitude towards the millenarians. He refused to extrapolate seditious, 
anti-Catholic or anti-Jewish political messages from the Apocalypse and generally 
accepted the praeterist position though he was agnostic about many of the details, 
especially when given any “mystical” interpretation46. 
     Leibniz’s tolerance (for the most part) of millenarianism did not preclude his 
willingness to occasionally have fun at the expense of its supporters. His irony and 
wit are obvious in remarks such as this one, concerning William Whiston’s dating of 
the start of the millennial kingdom: “If Mr Whiston is right in explaining the 
Apocalypse mathematically, there would be no need for us to concern ourselves with 
anything since Jesus Christ will visibly come to reign on the Earth in 1715”47. In 
another example, Leibniz apologizes to a correspondent that he has neither the time 
nor the energy to read Pierre Jurieu’s book – L’Accomplissement des Prophéties 
(1686) – but hopes “to find an easier way to figure out what to make of it, provided 
that he lives for another three and a half years”48. The latter time span, of course, 
refers to the “1260 days” of the Apocalypse (12:6), which Jurieu and others 
interpreted as referring to the 1260 years of the reign of the Anti-Christ. This was to 
end, according to their calendrical calculations, between 1710 and 171549. Neither of 
Leibniz’s responses to these millenarian interpretations reveal any deep-seated 
disapproval or concern, but only a mild bemusement at those who endorsed them50. 
 
VI. Leibniz’s Use and Abuse of Millenarianism 
 
     Leibniz’s references to millenarianism in his political writings are likewise often 
made tongue-in-cheek, though here they also have a more serious purpose: to serve as 
tools of diplomatic persuasion. In his Consilium Aegyptiacum (1671-1672), his 
sycophantic effort to convince Louis XIV to attack the Turks and invade Egypt in 
order to relieve the pressure on Germany, he tells the king that the radical Protestant 
sects (Socianians, Mennonites, Puritans, etc.) plan to get together with the Turks. 
Between them they “promise to bring down the House of Austria, overthrow 
                                                                                                                                            
but we have no need of such hypotheses or fictions, where Wit plays a greater part than Revelation and 
which even Reason cannot turn to account”. Theodicy, trans. E. M. Huggard and intro. A. Farrar, La 
Salle, Ill. 1955, pp. 133-134; GP VI, 112-113. 
46 A I, 4, 358; A I, 7, 203; A I, 9, 228. 
47 GP III, 313. Whiston’s dating of the start of the millennium is to be found in An essay on the 
Revelation of Saint John, so far as concerns the past and present times, 1706, p. 215 and p. 270. He 
actually dates the start of the millennium to “1715 or 1716”. 
48 A I, 11, 369. 
49 Ibid., note. Cf. A I, 14, 742. 
50 Leibniz’s preparedness to satirize millenarians extended not just to their interpretations of the 
Apocalypse, but also their penchant for what Catherine Wilson has called “theatrical catastrophism” 
(Wilson: Leibniz’s Metaphysics, p. 296). For example, in the “Mars Christianissimus” Leibniz writes: 
“But there is such a Jeremiah [to warn all those who oppose the King], who has just appeared, so that 
the Germans have no more excuses. It is a certain village curate in Germany who has set himself up 
lately as a prophet, and who proves invincibly by the Apocalypse that all of the King’s enemies will 
perish. Events have confirmed his predictions; for the Italians, jealous of glory of the King, suffer from 
the heat of the sun, and from the drought; the Dutch, envious of his happiness, are [being] punished by 
floods which make them fear at every moment a final devastation. [Ungrateful Sweden has suffered a 
horrible cold-wave]”. The Political Writings of Leibniz, ed. and trans. by P. Riley, Cambridge 
University Press 1981, p. 129; A IV, 2, 482 (French version; the bracketed sentence was interpolated 
by Riley from A. Foucher de Careil, Oeuvres de Leibniz, 2nd ed., Firmin Didot 1867, III, 14.) 
According to the Academy Edition, Leibniz is alluding to H. Kromeyer’s Commentarius in 
Apocalypsin Johanneam (1682). 
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“Babylon” of Rome and bring about the end of the Anti-Christ [the Pope]”51. Later in 
the same text, Leibniz spells out the consequences for Christendom of a successful 
military campaign against the Turks: 
 
“Happy age and worthy of the envy of all ages; happy us if we should happen to live in these times... 
The golden age of Christianity will return and we will move towards the primitive Church. And we 
will begin the most true millennium, without all the folly of the Fifth Monarchists”52. 
 
     Any temptation to see remarks such as these as betraying a youthful flirtation with 
millenarianism on Leibniz’s part should be resisted. For one thing, the millenarianism 
in evidence in the above passage is not corroborated by any of Leibniz’s other 
writings, whether from the same period of his career or any other, which one would 
reasonably expect if Leibniz had any genuine millenarian sympathies53. For another, 
the contents of Leibniz’s political writings are not always a reliable indicator of his 
own beliefs, a fact which has led Paul Ritter to warn that “one should be cautious 
before utilizing Leibniz’ political writings as sources for his views”54. Indeed, to 
develop this latter point, it should not be forgotten that Leibniz had a genuine 
diplomatic purpose in writing the “Consilium Aegyptiacum”, and that he was also 
pitching the plan to a renowned appreciator of flattery. It is therefore likely that 
Leibniz’s extravagant claim about Louis instigating (or at least hastening) the onset of 
the millennium was a calculated one, intended to ensure a warm reception for the 
Egypt plan from a man who might reasonably be expected to respond to promises of 
glory (and in a sense immortality) by playing a key role not just in earthly history, but 
cosmic history. 
     Indeed, Leibniz’s willingness to use millenarianism for political ends is also 
demonstrated by his “Mars Christianissimus” (1683), a brutal satire of the same 
monarch to whom the “Consilium Aegyptiacum” had been addressed. According to 
the “Mars Christianissimus”, however, the Sun King is not the possible instigator of 
the coming millennium but the very embodiment of it: “Everything which is 
prophesied of the Empire of Jesus Christ on earth must be understood [as applying to] 
                                                 
51 Leibniz continues: “...the most rigid believers of this party interpret the passage of the Apocalypse 
[16:12] where the prophet speaks of the Kings of the East meeting on the banks of the dried-up 
Euphrates” as referring to the Turks overrunning Europe. A IV, 1, 373. Turkey recently completed a 
series of dams across the Euphrates: this is being touted as an omen by some contemporary 
millenarians. 
52 A IV, 1, 380. 
53 Indeed, in the “Consilium Aegyptiacum” Leibniz adopts a number of positions which are not to be 
found anywhere else in his corpus, for example his bigoted stance towards the Jews and the Dutch. For 
more on this feature of the text, see D. Cook: “Leibniz’s use and abuse of Judaism and Islam” in: 
Leibniz and Adam, ed. by M. Dascal and E. Yakira, Tel Aviv University Publishing Projects 1993, pp. 
290-291. 
54 P. Ritter, Leibniz’ Aegyptisches Plan, O. Reichl Verlag 1930, p. 149, n.2. Some scholars have, 
however, identified millenarianist leanings in the young Leibniz. Richard Popkin, for instance, claims 
that Leibniz “exhibited strong Millenarian leanings in his Egyptian proposals and other writings”. See 
Popkin: “The Third Force”, p. 119. And Leroy Loemker claims that Leibniz “...no longer 
shared...[the]...chiliastic convictions” [our emphasis] with the Herborn Encyclopaedists – Alsted in 
particular – implying that at one time he did. See L. Loemker: “Leibniz and the Herborn 
Encyclopaedists”, Journal of the History of Ideas 22 (1961), p. 331. Loemker never documents 
Leibniz’s earlier millenarian sympathies – either in this article, or elsewhere in his extensive writings 
and commentaries on Leibniz. We agree with Popkin that it is difficult at times to know when Leibniz 
is serious, given his background as a diplomat and courtier as well as his often hypothetical style of 
philosophizing, but we think his diplomatic voice is more obvious in his political writings. See Popkin: 
“Leibniz and the French Skeptics”, pp. 228-248, and Cook, “Understanding the ‘Other’ Leibniz”, on 
Leibniz’s dissembling style. 
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the Empire of His Most Christian Majesty”55. With his tongue still firmly in his 
cheek, Leibniz goes on to say that in his role as God’s earthly representative, Louis 
must “establish on earth, happily for the flesh, the kingdom of Jesus Christ, which 
millennial heretics were waiting for, quite inappropriately, in the form of Jesus Christ 
in person”56. The bitter satire of Louis and his policies is made all the more effective 
by the apocalyptic language in which it is couched. Hence Leibniz saw 
millenarianism as a tool not merely suited to diplomatic persuasion but also to 
political satire. 
     However Leibniz was not only prepared to use millenarianism to further his 
political ends. In the last decade of his life he found a theological application for it 
too, as part of a planned epic theological poem entitled Uranias, which he conceived 
as a project for his chiliast acquaintance Johann Wilhelm Petersen. Leibniz forwarded 
a plan of this poem to Petersen via their mutual friend Fabricius in September 1711, 
and it is notable that in this plan Leibniz is prepared to “readily allow” millenarian 
doctrines to feature in the 6th and 7th books of the poem. To get a flavor of what 
Leibniz wanted, it is worthwhile quoting his plan of this poem at length: 
 
“It [Uranias] would have to begin with cosmogony and paradise, which would be the subject of the 
first book, or even the first and second. The third, fourth and fifth, if it were thought fit, would relate 
the fall of Adam and redemption of mankind through Christ, and touch on the history of the church. 
Then I would readily allow the poet to give in the sixth book a description of the millennial reign, and 
to depict in the seventh the anti-Christ invading with Gog and Magog, and finally overthrown by a 
breath from the divine mouth. In the eighth we would have the day of judgement and the punishments 
of the damned; in the ninth, tenth and eleventh, the happiness of the blessed, the grandeur and beauty 
of the City of God and of the abode of the blessed, and excursions through the immense spaces of the 
universe to illuminate the wonderful works of God; one would also add a description of the heavenly 
palace itself. The twelfth would end everything with the restitution of all things, that is, with the evil 
themselves reformed and restored to happiness and to God, with God henceforth operating all in all 
without exception. Here and there one might engage in a more sublime philosophy mixed with 
mystical theology, where the origin of things would be treated in the manner of Lucretius, Vida and 
Fracastor. A poet would be forgiven for things which would be harder to tolerate from a dogmatic 
theologian. Such a work would make its author immortal and could be wonderfully useful for moving 
the souls of men to hope for a better state and for lighting the sparks of a more genuine piety”57. 
 
     As Leibniz reveals near the end of this passage, the aim is for Uranias to have an 
edifying effect on its readers. This accords with what Leibniz says elsewhere, that 
reason and arguments are not generally what inspire people to piety; instead, 
according to Leibniz, for most people “something is needed which affects their 
passions and which ravishes their souls, as does music and poetry”58. But given 
Leibniz’s hope that Uranias would reach and stir those unmoved by more rational 
considerations59, how are we to explain the role of millenarian doctrines in the sixth 
                                                 
55 A IV, 2, 479; Riley: The Political Writings of Leibniz, p. 127. 
56 A IV, 2, 480; Riley: The Political Writings of Leibniz, p. 128. 
57 Dutens, 5, 293-294. 
58 Grua I, 88-89. Leibniz actually had the Quakerism of William Penn in mind when writing this 
passage, although there is no reason to suppose that his remarks are intended to apply only to 
Quakerism. For instance, see Leibniz’s remarks in his letter to von Bodenhausen from 21 February/2 
March 1696 concerning the ability of mystics, enthusiasts and Quakers to inspire souls to piety: ‘I am 
not at all among those who right off reproach and condemn such people, but rather I count myself 
among those who believe that certain people can indeed have a special calling from God to lead a 
singular life – far removed from mundane matters – and thereby [are able] to awaken others from their 
slumber.’ A I, 12, 445. 
59 This view is promoted also by Maria Rosa Antagonazza and Howard Hotson, who suggest that 
Petersen’s poetic treatment “is far more able to arouse love of God and hope for better things” than 
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and seventh books of the poem? Given the poetic nature of the piece, it is plausible to 
suppose that Leibniz intended millenarian doctrine to function as a metaphor for the 
battle between good and evil, in which good is triumphant. Moreover, by utilizing 
events which feature in the Apocalypse, Leibniz has identified a distinctly Christian 
way of depicting this battle, and as such millenarianism is a fit topic for an epic poem 




     This paper has shown that Leibniz’s attitude towards millenarianism was not 
straightforward. He favored and promoted a praeterist interpretation of the 
Apocalyptic prophecies in order to undermine other interpretations which were 
sometimes used to justify subversive political activity. By and large, however, 
Leibniz was generally unconcerned about and thus tolerant towards millenarian 
interpretations, provided that they were non-seditious; to such interpretations his 
response was limited to mild disapproval, or even light-hearted satire. And while 
Leibniz was not in any way influenced by or sympathetic to apocalyptic elements in 
the 17th-century millenarian tradition, he was willing to exploit such beliefs for 
theological and political purposes. But in spite of Leibniz’s generally negative 
assessment of apocalyptic claims, there was some common ground between him and 
the millenarians: while denying their “sense of urgency...in overthrowing Antichrist 
(the papacy and the empire)”, he did however share their “sense of urgency...in the 
zeal with which he pursued some of the same goals” such as “extending education, ... 
mastering nature, ... unifying the churches, ... persuading theists, ... and converting the 
Jews”60. This “positive side” of the millenarian tradition in Europe appealed to 
Leibniz because it entailed, for him as many others (from Bacon to Newton) a belief 
in progress through the increase of human knowledge61. 
                                                                                                                                            
Leibniz’s own philosophical reasonings. Maria Rosa Antognazza and Howard Hotson: Alsted and 
Leibniz on God, Harrassowitz Verlag 1999, p. 198. 
60 Loemker, “Leibniz and the Herborn Encyclopaedists”, pp. 331-332. 
61 A belief which finds its most unambiguous expression in a short text entitled ‘άποκατάστασις’, 
written in 1715. See De l’horizon de la doctrine humaine, ed. Michael Fichant, Vrin 1991, pp. 66-76. 
